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C
urrently planned greenhouse gas 
mitigation efforts would not pre-
vent climate warming from going 
beyond 2°C as aspired to in the 
2015 Paris Agreement (1), adding to 
climate-related impacts already un-
der way (2). Although climate adaptation 
has been strengthened in the Paris Agree-
ment, climate-related risks may exceed 
adaptation possibilities of communities 
and countries. To this effect, an important 
decision in the Paris Agreement was the 
endorsement of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage 
(L&D) (3). This established L&D as a dis-
tinct pillar of climate negotiations, yet with 
an unclearly defined remit. With a policy 
framework yet to emerge, the 22nd Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP 22) of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) in November in Mar-
rakesh will review the structure, mandate, 
and effectiveness of the WIM, first institu-
tionalized in 2013. Risk science can provide 
a rationale and delineate a policy space for 
L&D, composed of curative measures for 
unavoided and unavoidable impacts, and 
transformative measures for avoiding and 
managing intolerable risks. 
Climate risks considered by the WIM are 
associated with extreme events—flooding, 
droughts, heat waves, and cyclones—and 
slow-onset impacts, including sea level rise 
and melting glaciers. Lacking official defini-
tion, losses have been associated with irre-
versibility—e.g., fatalities from climate events 
or households stuck in disaster-induced 
poverty traps, whereas damages refer to 
impacts that can be alleviated. A useful dis-
tinction has been made between avoidable, 
unavoided, and unavoidable L&D (4).
Discussion of the WIM has been con-
tested (5) and wide-ranging (6). The Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS), whose mem-
bers face substantial climate-related stress, 
initiated the debate more than two decades 
ago, proposing that parties with historically 
high emissions take responsibility via some 
sort of compensation instrument. With en-
dorsement from other vulnerable develop-
ing countries, AOSIS has been arguing for 
an international mechanism basically made 
up of two components: support for risk 
management, including insurance efforts, 
and a rehabilitation or compensatory com-
ponent addressing increasingly negative 
impacts (7). Many developed countries con-
cur in principle on the need to help those 
suffering from climate change impacts but 
have been unwilling to accept notions of 
liability and have stressed the need to in-
stitutionalize incentives for tackling risks 
(8), as, for example, suggested by the 2015 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion (DRR) (9). These parties suggested to 
cover the matter under adaptation, but the 
decision to have a standalone article of the 
Paris agreement (Article 8) refer to the WIM 
came about only after developing countries 
insisted that L&D is distinct. Vulnerable 
countries celebrated the inclusion of the 
WIM in the agreement, while developed 
countries managed to include assurance 
that the WIM does not provide a basis for 
liability and compensation, which remain 
important background issues informing 
any potential implications of the WIM. 
A CLIMATE RISK SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
Assessments of climate change impacts have 
shifted in focus from academic to more op-
erational, including engagement of multiple 
stakeholders via novel risk analytical meth-
ods (10, 11). Work had originally focused on 
tracing incremental impacts induced by 
global warming in order to identify “danger-
ous” anthropogenic interference for climate 
mitigation and adaptation purposes (IPCC’s 
five Reasons for Concern) (12). An emergent 
perspective assesses risk as shaped by both 
climate variability and climate change and 
seeks to support climate risk management 
(CRM) at different scales (13). CRM aligns 
DRR, focused on sudden-onset hydrome-
teorological and geophysical events, with 
climate change adaptation (CCA), tackling 
slow-onset and sudden-onset climate-related 
impacts. CRM’s overall remit is to anticipate, 
avoid, prevent, and finance risks as well as 
absorb remaining impacts. 
CRM includes concern for CCA/DRR 
gaps—the difference between what we want 
or need and what we actually have and im-
plement in terms of funds, technology, and 
knowledge for risk management (14). Socially 
desirable levels of CRM will generally be less 
stringent than technically and physically 
feasible because of a number of negotiated 
trade-offs; e.g., costly flood protection, even 
in well-protected countries, ends at 50- to 
100-year-flood return levels. Considerations 
of risk preference (15) have entered the de-
bate (and IPCC) to provide classifications 
of risk as acceptable (no additional action 
necessary), tolerable (action required con-
sidering costs and other constraints), and 
intolerable (action required irrespective of 
constraints) (16). 
Risk and risk tolerance are socially con-
structed. Although the IPCC, with medium 
and high levels of confidence, has identified 
many regions as facing substantial stress 
from climate change–exacerbated risks, what 
constitutes acceptable, tolerable, and intol-
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erable is strongly determined by social, cul-
tural, and economic determinants and often 
requires joint subjective and expert delib-
eration before being submitted to allocating 
responsibilities. Risk analysis has developed 
analytical procedures for negotiating and 
segregating risk according to risk preference 
(“risk layering”) that have been used in the 
insurance industry and are being applied to 
climate risk issues to help allocate risks to 
multiple actors at various scales (17). 
An important dimension requiring more 
attention is climate justice, which scientifi-
cally is linked with attributing impacts to 
anthropogenic climate change, identifying 
harm-doing and burden-sharing of benefits 
and costs. Burden-sharing has been neces-
sary because many vulnerable countries are 
in need of international support for tackling 
adaptation gaps. The international com-
munity has shared such obligations under 
principles of distributive justice (18), not re-
quiring climate attribution of risks for gen-
erating international support, such as via 
the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion. There is a need to consider compensa-
tory justice due to the unequal distribution 
of historical and current emissions, as well 
as potential irreversible loss (19). The IPCC 
has attributed trends in slow-onset climate 
change and some climate extremes to an-
thropogenic greenhouse gas emissions— 
also pointing out that risk causation is often 
multifactorial, with climate change and so-
cioeconomic change as key risk drivers (10). 
Yet, although climate science has been mak-
ing progress in climate attribution, linking 
anthropogenic emissions to impacts and to 
risks to people, property, and ecosystems re-
mains complex, particularly for sudden-on-
set events (20). Both justice principles can 
be combined, yet balance needs attention. 
Many developing countries are worried that 
emphasis could be put on national respon-
sibility for managing risks, rather than in-
ternational law considerations associated 
with the “polluter pays” principle propor-
tional to emissions contributions (21). 
THE L&D RISK AND POLICY SPACE
Aligning emerging analytical insight, we 
build and extend a schematic scenario assess-
ment of risks and CRM conducted by IPCC’s 
5th assessment report at regional scale and 
for groups of countries for slow and sudden-
onset events (see the figure). The exemplary 
visualization applies the CRM framework to 
Small Island States faced with sea level rise 
and high–water level events. The IPCC con-
siders today’s risk as grave (medium), with 
further risk avoidance and reduction po-
tential due to a considerable DRR/CCA gap 
(22). For example, technically and physically 
feasible DRR and CCA, such as elevating 
seawalls or maintaining coastal landforms, 
could bring risk down to acceptable levels 
today. Relying on national resources has gen-
erally not sufficed to reduce risk sufficiently 
in these countries, particularly for those in 
the Pacific, Caribbean, and Indian Ocean, 
and support from the international com-
munity has been required. In the near term, 
sea level rise will increase risks shaped by 
climate change and socioeconomic factors 
(increase of people and assets in harm’s way). 
Although there is scope for DRR/CCA, some 
further risk is locked-in already, with serious 
cost implications (e.g., costs associated with 
upgrading coastal protection). The risk has 
increased, and part of this cannot be reduced 
anymore (not all land is being protected from 
flooding). We term these additional measures 
and necessary costs curative. Over time, risk 
is projected to increase. Challenges and costs 
will increase to well-tested CCA and DRR 
measures, and for strong warming (4oC), 
risks become intolerable (23). Novel, trans-
formative measures are needed, such as of-
fering alternative livelihoods (e.g., switching 
from farming to services) and assisting with 
voluntary migration, as compared to curative 
support for forced migration. 
Overall, with climate change amplifying 
risk, there is a legitimate case for interna-
tional financial and operational support on 
L&D to tackle avoidable but intolerable loss 
and damage by picking up part of the bur-
den from DRR and CCA domains (the trans-
formative part); with feasible risk reduction 
becoming limited over time, constraining 
societally desirable implementation path-
ways, measures for dealing with unavoided 
Nus repudam sunt etumqui 
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and unavoidable L&D, both tolerable and 
intolerable, will need further attention (the 
curative part).
BEYOND CURRENT DELIBERATIONS
A broad climate risk analysis perspective 
may provide a framework for negotiating 
responsibilities and leading to principled 
action. Action already under way can be in-
tegrated into the framework. What we call 
transformative action is seeing attention 
with pledges made by the G7 to support the 
“climate risk insurance” initiative, which 
aims to provide insurance cover for climate-
related risks to an additional 400 million un-
insured people in developing countries (24). 
This is connected to DRR support already 
granted for managing climate (and geophys-
ical) variability via regional sovereign disas-
ter risk insurance pools for Caribbean and 
Pacific island states, as well as countries in 
Central America and Africa. The transforma-
tive component to be further strengthened 
arises from efforts to broaden to compre-
hensive DRR, including risk prevention (e.g., 
coastal protection for low-lying islands) 
and preparedness (e.g., enhanced provision 
of functional flood early warning systems), 
and to build resilience, such as enabling 
farmers to take up-side risks (e.g., novel crop 
varieties with higher profits) in addition to 
better managing down-side risks.
It has been unclear whether the $300 
million pledged for climate insurance is 
truly additional. Thus better integrating 
CCA and DRR with transformative climate 
risk management efforts may ensure that 
intolerable risks are strongly acted upon 
via global solidarity, a keen demand by de-
veloping countries, rather than subsumed 
under country-driven approaches involving 
national responsibility. In adding L&D ef-
forts to CRM, the distinction from support 
for DRR and CCA might be that the WIM 
covers intolerable risk building on some 
sort of an attribution signal (an extreme cli-
mate facility, to be triggered by attributed 
changes in underlying climate variability, is 
being discussed for the Africa drought risk 
insurance pool) (25). What we call curative 
action has not really seen direct action, al-
though there is nascent debate on a climate 
displacement coordination facility, which 
may deal with planned migration and legal 
status for involuntary displacement of com-
munities that permanently have lost homes 
or homelands. 
There is a very important role for science 
in this contested political debate. The WIM 
Executive Committee recently decided to 
set up task forces with suggested participa-
tion of scientists on risk management (in-
cluding transformational approaches) and 
displacement. Major scientific challenges 
remain, in particular to help better under-
stand the physical and social limits of ad-
aptation. Translating the largely schematic 
climate risk assessment into quantitative-
qualitative projections of rising climate 
risks and associated costs of transforma-
tive and curative measures can help take 
the discourse on L&D forward as well as 
motivate action toward the ambitious miti-
gation goals set in Paris.  j
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Adapted from (2, 22, 23). The scenarios identify classes of curative measures for unavoided and unavoidable 
impacts and transformative measures for avoiding and managing intolerable risks.
